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To Harmonise or Not to Harmonise? The Case of Cross-national 
Biotechnology Governance in Southern Africa                                   
Julius Mugwagwa1
Abstract
This paper is based on a study which investigated both existing and new regulatory responses to food emergencies and 
bigger challenges presented by modern gene-based biotechnologies. In particular, this paper looks at the challenge of 
cross-national cooperation in regulation of these technologies in southern Africa. One response to this challenge which 
has dominated policy agendas in the region for a long time, and with more prominence after the 2002-2003 food emer-
gency, is that of harmonisation of national biosafety regulatory systems. Harmonisation is touted by its promoters as 
one way in which countries can buttress weaker national and sub-national regulatory capacities, and develop synergies 
that will place them in a strong position to deal with the dynamic challenges presented by modern biotechnologies. The 
desire for cross-national cooperation in biotechnology management was investigated from the broader perspective of 
policy convergence, with harmonization being but one of the mechanisms towards the policy convergence. A number 
of factors facilitating or inhibiting policy convergence were identified, including but not limited to cultural, institutional, 
socio-economic and policy community attributes. The paper concludes that an understanding of these factors is crucial 
if grounded empirical and theoretical proposals on cross-national policy convergence are to be advanced.
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Introduction
‘Instead of thinking about policy as a routine engagement 
between certain public officials and a settled retinue of 
established interests, we are now forced to consider how 
a single system is constructed from semi-independent 
institutions and actors linked by resource agreements, 
joint agreements, joint projects and cross-border 
engagements … it is really composed of pads of unequal 
size, each contributing to a characteristic policy ‘footprint’ 
(Considine, 2005:127).
Background
Southern African countries have found themselves in the 
throes of food emergencies in the past, for example, in 
1991, when a severe drought combined with inadequate 
human, infrastructural and organizational capacity in 
domestic markets to severely constrain food supplies 
leaving millions of people on the verge of starvation 
(Omamo and von Grebmer, 2005:2). The food emergency 
of 2002-2003 had, by and large, the same cast of issues – 
drought, infrastructural, organizational and policy factors 
– BUT with an additional challenge – that the thousands of 
tonnes of food available to help cover the shortages were 
suspected to contain unspecified amounts of genetically 
modified (GM) maize. Uncertainties around food and 
environmental safety and regulatory preparedness 
meant that some countries were unwilling to accept the 
food aid, with some governments going on record to 
‘choose starvation’, rather than let their people consume 
‘poisonous food’2 (e.g. Panos Report No.49, 2005:30). The 
challenges that this dilemma presented ranged from the 
grandiose and perennial task of putting in place regulatory 
and institutional arrangements to the mundane logistical 
hurdles of ‘how to load grain into rail cars and trucks 
with minimal escape, how to cover the loaded cars 
and trucks and how long to allow the trucks to sit in 
given positions’ (Omamo and von Grebmer, 2005:2). 
The scenario created tension at various levels: within 
countries, between countries, with food relief agencies 
and donors, among others, as affected countries in the 
region endeavoured to make the best decision, both 
individually and collectively, under pressure from the food 
emergency and the uncertainty posed by the suspected 
GM-food (Moola and Munnik, 2007).  At the policy level, 
the dilemma is attributed with having raised the political 
temperature around regulation of biotechnology3, both 
within countries and at the cross-national level. At the 
national level for example, a number of measures had to 
put in place to guide decision-making, with some countries, 
e.g. Zimbabwe and Malawi, deciding to distribute only 
milled grain and Zambia refusing the grain outright 
(Mafa, 2004; Moola and Munnik, 2007, Clark et al, 2005). 
At the regional level, Southern African Development 
Community4 (SADC) agriculture ministers cited the lack 
of a harmonized regional position on GMOs as creating 
serious operational problems in the movement of food 
and non-food items, and recommended the formation of 
an advisory committee on biotechnology and biosafety5 
to develop guidelines on this issue and t-he broader issues 
around biotechnology (SADC 2003). Meanwhile, SADC 
Heads of State in their August 2003 Summit in Maputo, 
Mozambique, set a deadline of December 2004 for all 
countries of the SADC region to put in place national 
biosafety systems6 (SADC, 2004).
2 For a detailed account of the 2002/2003 food aid challenge in southern Africa, see Clark et al  (2005) and Herrick (2008).
3 The science of biotechnology has as many terms as it does skeptics. A number of synonyms are in use for the for the process or science of 
biotechnology including: “genetic modification” and “genetic engineering” or the term “agbiotech.” The food products of biotechnology can be 
referred to as GMOs, transgenic foods, GM foods, genetically engineered (GE) foods, or biotech foods. These terms have been used interchan-
geably in this paper for the sake of variation but all refer to the same process and product.
4 The 15 countries making up SADC are: Angola, Botswana, DR Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Se-
ychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. They are all at significantly different levels with respect to development 
and utilization of biotechnology, and the measures for governing it. South Africa is the leading country, not only in the SADC region, but the 
whole of Africa, having already commercialized production of GM maize and cotton, and also having a legally-binding biosafety system since 
1997. Zimbabwe (1998), Mauritius (2002), Malawi (2004) and Zambia (2006) are the other countries that have biosafety legislation, while the 
rest of the countries have draft legislation still at various levels of progress towards enactment (see further details in Mugwagwa, 2008:30).
5 Further details in section on SADC.
6 In this paper, a national biosafety framework or system is defined as “a combination of policy, legal, administrative and technical instru-
ments that are developed to ensure an adequate level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified or-
ganisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, 
taking also into account risks to human health” (ref; UNEP-GEF, 2006).
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While all this was happening, the key issues and realities 
for biosafety are that while there is a significant level of 
agreement on the potential risks associated with GM 
technologies; for example environmental risks from 
gene flow to non-cultivated plants, agronomic risks from 
resistance problems in the GM crops and in weeds, co-
existence challenges between fields of farmers using 
GM-crops and those not using them; among others 
– there is still considerable disagreement within and 
across countries regarding the level of these risks and 
the scientific possibilities for adequately assessing and 
addressing them (Birner and Linacre, 2008). Add to these 
the disagreements on the so-called non-science issues, 
such as labelling of food and feed derived from GM crops, 
and socio-economic issues around the technologies, 
one then begins to sympathise with the existence of a 
continuum of regulatory systems, ranging from the 
‘stringent’ EU system on one end to the ‘permissive’ US 
system on the other end (Levidow et al, 1996, Paarlberg, 
2000). As noted by Arcuri (2001), a ‘regulatory divide’ has 
emerged, championed by ‘technocrats’ on one hand, who 
believe in a rational application of the science to identify 
and manage the risks; and a ‘deliberative’ philosophy on 
the other hand, which embeds scientific knowledge within 
policy and societal debates (cf. Birner and Linacre, 2008). 
These divides also exist in the SADC region, and how they 
oppose or cultivate fertile grounds for cooperation are 
among the key areas of focus for this paper. One agenda 
which has dominated policy discussions in the region for a 
long time, and unsurprisingly with more prominence after 
the food emergency, is that of harmonisation of national 
regulatory systems. Harmonisation is touted by its 
promoters as one way in which countries can strengthen 
weaker national and sub-national regulatory capacities, 
and develop synergies that will place them in a strong 
position to deal with the dynamic challenges presented 
by the technologies and products thereof. A number of 
organizations have entered the policy arena in southern 
Africa, to champion the harmonisation agenda directly, 
or to tackle other levels within the policy/regulation 
development spectrum. The study on which this paper 
is based focused on the roles of three supranational 
organizations (SNOs), the African Union (AU), the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 
bringing about this cross-national cooperation. This paper, 
while making reference to how the three organisations and 
related others are aligning themselves to help countries in 
this agenda, focuses primarily on the contextual realities 
facilitating or constraining harmonisation specifically or 
policy convergence processes broadly. Meanwhile, to 
avoid a ‘mechanism-dependent bias’ (c.f. Bennett, 1991), 
this desire for cross-national cooperation was investigated 
from the broader perspective of policy convergence, with 
harmonisation being but one of the mechanisms towards the 
envisaged collective response to the collective challenge.
Some key processes towards cross-national 
cooperation in biosafety 
The African Union set up a group of experts in June 1999 to 
draft a comprehensive framework of biosafety regulations 
that would serve as a model law to protect Africa’s 
biodiversity, environment and the health of its people. 
This initiative resulted in the African Model Law (AML) on 
Safety in Biotechnology which was finalized in May 2001. 
In July 2003 Decision EX/CL/Dec.20-74 (III)7   of the AU 
Executive Council endorsed the Africa-wide Capacity 
Building Programme on Biosafety in which adoption of the 
AML was encouraged for creation of ‘a harmonised Africa-
wide space and system in biosafety …’. In November 2006, 
the Human Resources, Science and Technology (HRST) 
Directorate of the AU Commission proposed an African 
Strategy on Biosafety8 in which, among other issues 
harmonisation through Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs) and use of the AML was encouraged. A December 
2006 Conference of AU Ministers of Agriculture9 declared 
an ‘African Position on GMOs in Agriculture’, emphasizing 
the precautionary approach and establishment of a 
‘mechanism to facilitate harmonisation of regulatory 
systems’ e.g. through encouraging and facilitating dialogue 
between RECs (SADC being one of these). Since 2005, 
the HRST Directorate has implemented an Africa-wide 
Biosafety Capacity Building Project with funding from the 
German Government. 
7AU EX/CL/Dec.20-74 (III)
8AU (2006b). African Strategy on Biosafety
9 AU Dec 2006a – An African Position on GMOs in Agriculture
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The Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
is recognised as one of the first of Africa’s regional 
economic communities (RECs) to develop guidelines on 
GMOs and Biotechnology, and this happened in response 
to the food aid crisis which followed the 2002-2003 
drought in the region10. In 2003, the SADC Secretariat, 
through its Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources 
(FANR) Unit set up the SADC Advisory Committee on 
Biotechnology and Biosafety (SACBB), to draft guidelines/
recommendations on handling of food aid, policy and 
regulations (including harmonisation), capacity-building 
and public participation in biotechnology and biosafety. 
The Committee was reconstituted in 2007 after a three 
year period of low activity to develop and propose 
institutional arrangements for a ‘SADC Framework on the 
Safe Handling and Transboundary Movement of GMOs’11. 
The proposed framework recommends establishment 
of a SADC Biosafety Focal Point, to which Member 
States will communicate national decisions on GMOs. 
Among other provisions, countries will be responsible 
for monitoring their obligations under the Framework; 
while cooperation in research and development on 
biotechnology and biosafety is ‘encouraged’ and the 
SADC Secretariat is tasked to ‘coordinate and mobilise 
the required resources’. Disputes among countries will 
be referred to the SADC Tribunal (Article 16 of the 
SADC Treaty). Meanwhile, in 2007, through the SADC 
Ministerial Council on Science and Technology12, the 
region developed a Protocol13 on Science, Technology and 
Innovation (STI) in which harmonisation of biotechnology 
policies and regulations is one of the targets. An STI Unit 
is proposed, to be housed in the SADC Secretariat. 
In 2005, NEPAD, in partnership with the AU set up a high 
level African Panel on Biotechnology (APB) to analyze the 
African biotechnology terrain and make recommendations 
on how best to use the technology for Africa’s 
development, including developing an African strategy on 
biotechnology and biosafety. The APB was mandated to 
propose and promote the adoption of a regional strategy 
that reflects Africa’s common values, articulates shared 
needs and focuses on common opportunities. The Panel 
produced a report, Freedom to Innovate: Biotechnology 
in Africa’s Development (Juma and Serageldin, 2007) 
which was disseminated to key partners and regional 
economic communities. Meanwhile, NEPAD, through its 
Office of Science and Technology (OST)14 and the African 
Ministerial Council on Science and Technology also 
implements an African Biosciences Initiative (ABI) and the 
African Consolidated Plan of Action (CPA) for Science 
and Technology through Centres of Excellence in Eastern, 
Western, Southern and Northern Africa as part of a ‘co-
evolution approach’ to technology and policy development. 
Policy convergence
Policy convergence is premised on growth in similarity 
of policies, policy scope, institutional and implementation 
arrangements, among others (Bennett, 1991; Knill, 2005). 
Policy convergence thus constitutes the results of a process 
in which countries are assumed to have moved from varying 
positions towards some common point. While knowledge 
that national policies have converged is useful, it remains 
silent about the motivations behind the convergence, and 
the mechanisms through which the convergence has been 
achieved. This paper presents and discusses research 
findings based on the different conceptions of similarity, 
how it occurs and how to measure it. An open-ended 
strategy, grounded in participants’ accounts, document 
reviews and observations was used.
This study drew inspiration from other studies and 
published works on cross-national policy convergence, and 
on multi-actor interactions broadly [for example Busch 
and Jorgens (2005); Dolowitz and Marsh (2005); Seeliger 
(1996); Holzinger, et al, (2006); Franzese and Mosher (2002) 
and Gauthier (2002); among others]. The cross-cutting, 
multi-level and multi-actor nature of biotechnology and 
biosafety issues, combined with the cross-national level 
at which the issue was being investigated, meant that a 
number of conceptual and theoretical perspectives would 
come to the fore in trying to understand this issue. 
The study was about how countries are attempting to 
exploit technological opportunities and manage risk 
at a multi-country level, and about how they try to be 
innovative within the different pressures they face, both 
as individual countries and as a collective entity. The 
10 e.g. Clark et al, 2005
11 Ref – Draft SADC Framework on the Safe Handling and Transboundary Movement of GMOs
12 This is part of the African Ministerial Council on Science and Technology (AMCOST), which is coordinated by the NEPAD.
13 Ref: SADC – Draft 2 – Protocol on Science, Technology and Innovation
14  www.nepadst.org
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aim was understand how the differences on many fronts 
within the countries were serving as a rallying point for a 
transnational governance arrangement.
The main focus of most studies on policy convergence is 
on policy output, i.e. the policies adopted by the countries, 
as opposed to the policy outcome. Policy outcomes are 
usually affected by many intervening variables, which 
make it difficult if not impossible to relate the outcomes 
directly to the causal mechanisms of convergence. 
Therefore it would not be surprising to find convergence 
at the level of output, but divergence at the outcomes 
level. With respect to research hypotheses, many authors 
are in agreement that formulating hypotheses on the 
level of convergence is a difficult task because identifying 
the level or ‘point’ of a policy to then come up with a 
convergence point is not always easy (Holzinger and 
Knill, 2005a). Convergence implies a decrease in variation 
among policies over time, and the unit of measurement is 
thus the decrease in standard deviation from one point in 
time to another. A change in the regulatory level means a 
shift either downwards or upwards of the mean between 
the two measurement times (Botcheva and Martin, 
2001). Therefore to assess convergence, and a shift in 
the regulations, a reference point is needed. In this paper, 
the commencement time reference point was 2002, at 
which point the cross-national cooperation agenda was 
only beginning to gather momentum, and the regulatory 
systems in the countries were characterized by extensive 
diversity. The study covered a 6-year period up to 2007. 
In this period, because of the intensity of discussion of 
biosafety issues at national, regional and international levels, 
measurable activity towards convergence was expected. 
In addition to setting reference frames for the measurement 
of convergence, researchers are in general agreement 
that measurement of convergence is removed from the 
coincidence domain if observation of the phenomenon 
is made in a large sample of countries (Leifferink and 
Jordan, 2002). There is a possibility for changes to run 
parallel in two countries with different national sources 
of change. This was the motivation for looking at the 15-
country SADC region, as opposed to comparing only a 
few countries in the same region. 
An agenda embedded in images of risk
As presented earlier, cross-national policy convergence 
is defined as the increase in policy similarity between 
countries over time (e.g. Bennett, 1991). This section of 
the paper looks at some theoretical perspectives which 
bring an understanding of the different argumentations 
around the issue, and more importantly how these impact 
on the convergence agenda. From the onset, it emerged 
that the framing of issues in the discussions around cross-
national convergence of biosafety systems mirrored the 
same hopes and fears observed in the debates around the 
science of biotechnology itself. There was a prominent 
cluster of issues around the newness of the technology, 
and the expectations that it had built across societies. 
Negative impacts of some of the ‘failed’ promises of the 
technology (for example the lofty promises of increasing 
agricultural productivity and reducing hunger and poverty) 
were said to await its regulation. Past failures of some 
cross-national cooperation programmes, including even 
other unrelated science and technology programmes, 
were all lumped together as impediments to the 
convergence agenda. On the other hand, pro-convergence 
respondents highlighted success scored by the technology 
(e.g. GM cotton production by smallholder farmers in 
South Africa, disease diagnosis and therapeutic remedies, 
among others) and by the three organizations as pointers 
to potential success of the convergence agenda. 
To help illuminate how different motivations are shaping 
or responding to the convergence agenda, a number 
of theoretical perspectives are deployed, including the 
sociology of expectations in science and technology risk 
colonization theories explained below. 
Sociology of expectations
 
Societal views on new technological developments are 
shaped by events and experiences that societies have gone 
through in the past (Borup et al, 2006). These embedded 
images create favorable expectations or negative 
perceptions about development, resulting in significant 
impacts on the institutional and policy processes to 
receive and accommodate new developments. The close 
link between framings around a technology and those 
around its regulation make it worthwhile to focus on how 
expectations around science and technology shape 
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people’s understandings and framings of policy change. 
Expectations are defined as wishful enactments of the 
desired future (Borup et al, 2006). They are both positive 
and negative and the way an intervention is framed 
defines the expectations around it. Expectations and 
visions are not constant; they vary in space and time, 
and they span as well as bring together different groups 
within a society (Considine, 2005: 23). These groups and 
the linkages that they form may vary, say from country 
to country, making it difficult to predict how given 
groups of stakeholders in different jurisdictions would 
perceive certain technologies. However, with the rise of 
the knowledge society, knowledge has become a central 
driving element and there is also an increase in the amount 
of communication across national, institutional and 
epistemic borders (Borup et al, 2006; Evans and Davies, 
1999). This is expected not only to result in an increase in 
shared visions and meanings across frontiers, but across 
disciplinary boundaries and knowledge networks as well 
(Stone, 2000). Professionals in different disciplines have 
been seen to reach beyond the borders of their own 
specific fields of expertise to establish relationships with 
wider and more heterogeneous networks of potential 
collaborators. For this study, these dynamics were seen 
as factors with a potential to bring together motivations 
in the cross-national convergence agenda. 
The existence of a unified policy community, geared 
towards the envisaged output, is among the factors known 
to facilitate cross-national policy convergence (Gertler, 
2001; Drezner, 2001). Members of this community all 
recognize the problems caused by existing fragmentation, 
and are all prepared to set aside conceptual differences 
for the greater good of their polity through a consensual 
transnational governance framework. In the SADC, 
one challenge to the existence of such a unified policy 
community was that in the countries themselves, 
there was limited organizational, sectoral or national 
consensus on the issue. Expecting these differences to 
suddenly disappear at the regional level was labeled by 
one respondent as ‘a heroic dream’: the tensions and 
contentions would likely be elevated. The fact that the 
policy communities and policy networks in countries 
differed also affected the knowledge exchange that should 
happen between these stakeholders across countries, 
prior to the convergence process (cf. Levy, 1997). The 
absence of uniformity results in discordant communication 
across countries, a situation that can potentially hamper 
an already fragile policy agenda. 
Risk colonization
Continuing with the look at the organisation of the 
technology and policy debates around risk, another 
key theoretical perspective around the hopes and fears 
for convergence is the risk colonization theory. This 
theory is used here to build on to some of the issues 
illuminated by the sociology of expectations; but looking 
specifically at the distinction between societal risk and 
institutional risks. Risk colonization theory contends that 
‘risk has become an increasingly key organising concept’ 
or has ‘colonised’ debates about regulatory regimes 
and extended governance systems, so that we can also 
talk broadly of a ‘risk society’, where we have become 
concerned with ‘risk management of everything’ (Power, 
2004). According to Rothstein et al, (2006), institutional 
risk refers to ‘threats to regulatory organisations, and/
or the legitimacy of rules and methods of regulation’. 
As will be discussed later, one key issue mentioned by 
almost all the respondents throughout this study, was the 
importance of the process of obtaining convergence, as 
opposed to the actual convergence itself. Stakeholders 
were keen on owning and understanding the processes, 
and seeing that they were addressing their needs, and 
those of the region. There were thus pressures towards 
transparency, and accountability of the processes. By 
stepping onto the podium to champion the convergence 
agenda, the three SNOs (NEPAD, the AU and SADC) 
and programmes initiated by other organisations, were 
exposing themselves to scrutiny from the stakeholders 
both inside and outside the region. In their own accounts 
of issues around the convergence process, some 
operatives from these organisations also acknowledged 
this double focus on their systems and the technology 
itself, and the net result it had of raising stakeholder 
expectations on the issue. Some respondents also 
felt that there was too much fragility at the regional 
policy-making level, including the continuous shift by 
governments to new and more pressing policy agendas. 
Champions of this agenda thus faced increased risk of 
losing their reputation as a result of failed deliveries, e.g. 
from lack of resources, and lack of general stakeholder 
as well as political commitment to see through the 
processes. This paper seeks to bring further insight on 
these issues and an informed understanding on whether 
convergence is a positive, zero or negative sum game.
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Methodology
This paper emanates from a three-year case study which 
sought to understand existing and new impetus for cross-
national regulatory systems for modern biotechnology 
sparked in southern Africa by the 2002-2003 food aid 
crisis. The study examined the roles of the three SNOs, 
AU, NEPAD and SADC, who, together with other 
regional and international bodies have independently or 
jointly initiated processes to assist the 15-country SADC 
region towards cross-national similarity or convergence of 
biosafety systems. Those who participated15 in the study 
included scientists, policy makers and representatives 
of NGOs, the three SNOs and other policy actors 
from the region and beyond. The study was guided by 
the three factor conceptualisation of Per Olof Busch 
and Helge Jorgens (2005), which proposes cooperative 
harmonisation of domestic practices, interdependent but 
uncoordinated diffusion and coercive imposition of policy 
practices as three distinct international mechanisms 
causing policy change and policy convergence16 . A number 
of researchers have demonstrated that causes of domestic 
policy change do not come from national sources only, 
but they also quickly indicate that these causes are also 
not limited to isolated responses to global pressures 
either (Holzinger and Knill, 2005; Rose, 2000). Thus 
the theoretical perspectives, data gathering and analysis 
approaches for this study adopted an interdisciplinary 
and multi-method approach in navigating the complex 
technological, regulatory and socio-political settings. 
Data was collected primarily using questionnaires17, semi-
structured interviews and document reviews throughout 
the study period, and in-situ observation of processes 
and organisational interactions during a three-month 
internship at NEPAD in the middle of 2007 and during 
various meetings and workshops18 attended during the 
study period between 2006 and 2008. Analysis was 
done mainly using thematic analysis19 (Boyatzis, 1998). 
The following sections present and discuss the various 
technological, policy and wider contextual realities 
in southern Africa, and how they are shaping and/or 
responding to the convergence/harmonisation agenda.
15 Fifty six (56) responses obtained out of a total of 68 individual participants contacted at one stage or another throughout the data collec-
tion period between March 2006 and August 2007. Other statistics: 20 respondents participated in the pilot study; and 25 of the 68 (36.8%) 
completed the second questionnaire, 11 interacted with the project throughout, while 47 of the 56 were interacted with both formally and 
informally, i.e., beyond use of the questionnaires.
16 These three classes of mechanisms are distinct with regard to their mode of operation, the principal motivations of policy makers to 
adopt policies and the leeway they grant national policy makers to influence the content and independently decide on the adoption of 
a policy or regulatory system (Busch and Jorgens, 2005).  Examining everyday constructions of the convergence issues, and observation 
of policy processes, the three classes of mechanisms were seen to capture the range of options and forces facing the countries of the 
study region in their quest for a transnational governance framework for biosafety, and the aim was to understand how the SNOs were 
innovating around the context through use of these mechanisms. Therefore, the typology of Busch and Jorgens was chosen for its ability 
to serve both cognitive purposes and systematic analysis of policy convergence using a combination of mechanisms. Most of the research 
on convergence is currently limited to analysis of single mechanisms (Heichel et al, 2005, Bennett 1991 and Drezner, 2001). See Mugwagwa 
(2008) and Busch and Jorgens (2005) for further details on this typology.
17 Two sets of questionnaires were used as the main research instruments for this study. The questionnaire or checklist used at the be-
ginning of the study consisted of broad, open-ended questions which were aimed at identifying and mapping the key issues around the 
research topic. Design of this questionnaire was based on my prior experience in the geographical and policy area targeted by the research, 
and guided by literature surveys within the area of biotechnology regulation broadly and cross-national policy convergence specifically. 
 The second questionnaire raised questions and traced perspectives pursuant to issues emerging from the first round of the data gathering 
process and review of relevant literature.
18 Notably the 1st Congress of African Scientists and Policy Makers held in Alexandria, Egypt, Nov 2007
19 Thematic analysis can be defined as the interpretation of qualitative data through organizing it into codes, categories and themes 
(Boyatzis, 1998: 18). Themes, which are patterns found in the data, may be generated inductively from the raw data, or deductively from 
theory and prior research. Thematic analysis is a systematic way of working with information that increases the accuracy and sensitivity 
in understanding and interpreting observations.  According to Boyatzis (1998: 15), ‘thematic analysis can assist in communication between 
positivistic science and interpretive science, between testers of ideas and developers of ideas, between builders of theories and social 
constructionists’. This makes it an ideal approach for translating methods and results into forms accessible to others from different 
fields, orientations or traditions of inquiry, and for this research, this could not have been more appropriate given one of the underlying 
desires which was to bridge research and policy. In addition, biosafety is a cross-cutting undertaking, and the need for a robust analytic 
framework was therefore imperative. This approach was also useful in all stages of the research; from the early stages of the inquiry where 
it helped organize thoughts and emerging issues, to the interpretation stages, where it served as a guide for the emerging research story. 
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Reasons for desiring convergence
The reasons why convergence was desirable were invariably 
highlighted in the same vein with the reasons why general or 
broader cross-national cooperation or collaboration was 
desirable (cf. ECA, 2006). There was an underlying belief that 
having similar policy and regulatory systems would improve 
cooperation and collaboration across various sectors of the 
national economies (cf. Mugabe, 2001; SADC Review, 2001). 
In other words, barring different interpretation of similar 
policies, chances for policy and regulatory conflicts would 
be greatly minimized if countries had similar policies. With 
respect to biotechnology, this was largely seen as being even 
more fundamental because of the high attendant costs for 
setting up and running sustainable technological and policy 
systems (Ushewokunze-Obatolu, 2005; Birner and Linacre, 
2008). Therefore, while the cooperation agenda had been a 
key issue in the region for decades, biotechnology was seen 
as bringing a functional impetus to the agenda (cf. Radaelli, 
2000). Pro-convergence stakeholders, in particular laboratory 
scientists and regulatory officers, pointed to some costs which 
the region had had to bear already because of the fragmented 
approach to the development and regulation of biotechnology. 
Examples of these costs include the 2002/03 food aid debacle 
(Clark et al, 2005: 75) which brought divisions and loss of 
credibility to the scientific community. These tensions resulted 
in scientists spending most of their time debating biotechnology 
at the expense of their research duties. The credibility20 of the 
science community was highly shaken, especially because of the 
differences that arose among scientists in some of the countries, 
notably Zambia (Panos Report, 2005; Omamo and von Grebmer, 
2005: 7) and all this was largely attributed to the policy vacuum21 
(Ushewokunze-Obatolu, 2005). The vacuum resulted in many 
operatives in some of the smaller countries being called upon 
to make decisions beyond their capabilities (cf. Haas, 1992), 
stretching and compromising their already fragile positions.
In the backdrop of the challenges and opportunities brought by 
the technology, countries had sought to collaborate at different 
levels in order to bring synergies that would benefit all of them. 
As highlighted earlier, countries were at different levels of 
technology utilization and policy development and this was seen 
as having the potential to give positive impetus to coordinated 
development and management of the technology through 
experience-sharing among the countries. In a world in which 
developmental disparities can be a major driver for economic 
and technological cooperation (ECA, 2006; Newmark, 2002; 
also Wilson, 2007 on why knowledge differentials should be 
a resource not a problem), stakeholders in the region also 
saw geographical contiguity among the regional countries as a 
major benefit in the quest for cooperation. Requirements for 
cooperation driven by this geographical contiguity, where it not 
only became easier for the cooperation to happen, but the spill-
over effects of what happened within the confines of another 
country also made it essential for countries to work together. 
National borders were porous, and national cultures spanned 
these borders and shared policy arrangements were seen as 
one way of adequately preparing national institutions to deal 
with this reality. This view was in agreement with Article 26 of 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety which requires countries 
to take into account socio-economic considerations such as 
impact of living modified organisms on their neighbours before 
they made their decisions. Converged policy and regulatory 
systems would thus not only help countries deal with their 
internal challenges, but would also help them build regulatory 
and administrative capacity to deal with external challenges and 
opportunities and meet their obligations at the national, regional 
and international levels.
 
The technology also came with many competitive forces, 
especially from a market point of view where multinational 
corporations have a strong push (cf. Botcheva and Martin, 
2001). Fragmented efforts by countries of the region would 
not put them in a good position to deal with the forces, argued 
some respondents from science and technology research 
organisations. Cooperation and synergies would help to build 
the necessary scale economies to position the region not only 
as a strong force to resist technology and product dumping and 
other malpractices, but also as an attractive region for favourable 
technologies and products. Even in the face of countries enjoying 
different bilateral and multilateral partnerships, many argued that 
those separate partnerships would benefit from the backdrop of 
a united and coherent regional policy platform. 
Most of the national economies in the region were too small and 
too constrained in terms of technical and regulatory capacities 
to afford to develop, let alone support the various structures 
needed for effective management of modern technologies 
(Ushewokunze-Obatolu, 2005). Cooperation with other 
countries would enable responsibility-sharing in some of the 
aspects. One aspect mentioned consistently is risk assessment 
and management, where, because of the geographical and 
environmental similarities among the countries, it would be 
largely feasible for assessments or measures made in one 
country within the region to be applicable to other countries. 
In principle, capabilities for various technological and regulatory 
aspects around biotechnology could spread across clusters of 
countries and be made available for the benefit of the entire 
region. Having similar regulatory systems was expected to 
facilitate this spread. This mode of operation has been tried 
successfully in some areas (for example in the customs and 
excise under the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
where some goods do not need individual country approvals), 
and pro-convergence respondents called for the same concept 
to be tried for biotechnology management. A number of benefits 
would accrue to the countries and the region as a result of this 
20 E.g. meaning power to elicit belief or confidence among different stakeholder groups. 
21 Lack of policy direction or leadership 
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cooperation, experience-sharing and streamlining of procedures, 
including reducing procedure turnaround time and overall cutting 
of regulatory costs. From a risk management perspective, the 
bigger scale would enable the region to have a bigger voice when 
calling for enforcement of regulations meant to preserve the 
environment, e.g. as provided for under the Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety, as one proponent from one of the SNOs argued: 
‘‘For all intents and purposes, convergence of biosafety systems 
is about getting the best from the systems for the countries, for 
the region and for our technological and economic partners. It is 
not about giving the region unfair advantage, because at the end 
of the day, the region needs those same partners in the broader 
walk towards socio-economic development, and the benefits 
will accrue to everyone in the end. People talk about resistance 
to change, and this is a typical case where extra-regional forces 
are resisting change being motivated by the region, and our 
challenge is thus on how to make them see our vision in the 
same way as us’’ [Res2122 (S), Oct 2007].
A further dimension to the ‘discomfort’ among extra-regional 
forces was the strong feeling among some proponents of 
convergence that the region’s commitment to working together, 
including the convergence agenda, could be derailed by some 
powerful external forces who were sceptical about the region’s 
intentions and ability to sustain the commitment. Examples were 
given of supposedly negative reporting of issues before, during 
and after the AU summit of January 2007 regarding Africa’s 
preparedness to take science, technology and innovation issues 
seriously. It was felt that such negative perspectives, especially 
from ‘respected’ opinion shapers served as a hindrance to 
positive progress. Stakeholders indicated, almost pleaded, that 
while they welcomed and expected criticism, it was also prudent 
at times for the efforts being made to ‘at least receive some 
appreciation’ as a way of encouraging the continent. It was clear 
from this encounter that practitioners were keen to defend their 
programmes, with some even claiming that they spent a better part 
of their working time justifying and defending their programmes, 
further dissipating institutional resources. Why this could not 
be done by dedicated PR offices could not be ascertained, but 
the end result was that negative feelings were brought to the 
policy terrain, and the tension created could be felt for several 
months after the encounter. However, as Rothstein et al (2006) 
indicate, ‘blame-avoidance behaviour at the expense of delivering 
core business is a well-documented organisational rationality’. 
The other main reason why countries desired convergence 
was the envisaged cooperation in dealing with challenges being 
faced in developing and implementing national systems. The 
convergence agenda was thus related to how a country felt weak 
or vulnerable on its own, triggering the desire to collaborate 
with others. The areas of weakness, needing strengthening 
through cooperation, e.g. technical and legal capacity, varied 
from country to country, and they depended also on a country’s 
aspirations and targets with respect to biotechnology and 
biosafety. Variations also occurred within different policy 
communities in a given country. There were also different policy 
communities in each country, and multiple pressures on the 
convergence discourse from individual, institutional, sectoral, 
national, regional and international perspectives.
From the above, it was clear that the compelling factors for 
convergence varied from shared histories and cultural values, 
the need for synergistic and strategic cooperation in technology 
development, to the need to have a unified front as a regional 
economic market. Admittedly, some factors were stronger than 
others. As one policy maker from one of the SNOs noted;
‘‘Biosafety largely brings countries together or pits them against 
each other in the realms of trade and environmental safety. What 
then comes to the fore is how the two opposing forces balance each 
other out, bearing in mind that some countries pay more attention 
to one or the other set of issues’’ [Pmk223 (S), Aug, 2007] 
One observation that was made was the inconsistency and the 
varied emphasis around the issues that were brought to the 
agenda table. Some fora would emphasise the shared histories 
agenda, while others would dwell on the culture dimension, 
yet others would focus on the economic and technological 
benefits that could accrue to the region as a result of shared 
policy positions. Still it was not uncommon for all these issues 
to be debated in one forum, the sticking point always being 
how to bring them all together given the existing disciplinary 
boundaries, and in some cases the lack of representation in 
these fora from government agencies mandated to deal with 
those issues. The challenges encompassed both the framing 
and the operational dimensions, and this raised the barriers for 
the convergence agenda. Also, as mentioned earlier, the desire 
for convergence of the regulatory systems followed closely the 
debates in the technology itself, and the biggest forces around 
the issue related to the operational context for the regulations 
and the technology. The catch 22 for the technology and the 
regulations was that each was mentioned as being well placed to 
create opportunities for the other, and how this would unfold in 
reality remained to be seen.
Fears around convergence
The buoyancy about convergence was however not shared 
among all respondents, with some seeing it as another policy fad 
that would just disappear with time. It was interesting to observe 
that those who were skeptical were mainly those policy makers 
and regulators who had been in the policy arena for a long time, 
who therefore probably knew what was feasible and what was 
not, but who may also be just fatigued, and believing that nothing 
will ever change.  The newer players were quick to point fingers 
at the long-stayers, with one of them, a senior official in the 
ministry of science and technology in one of the countries saying;
22 Coded respondent: A researcher from one of the SNOs
23 A policy maker/senior official from one of the SNOs
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‘‘The biggest fear I have on this issue is that there are too 
many people who are tired, and who will never see things 
happening beyond what they deem feasible. These people 
have established themselves to such an extent that they 
cannot separate themselves from the issue, and any challenge 
to the status quo is perceived as a direct challenge to them 
as individuals and their wisdom. We have to start with 
such people if things are to change’’ [Pmk424 (R), July 2007].
It was very clear from the statement above and from 
the other realities observed in the region that the hopes 
and fears around the technology, its regulation and the 
convergence agenda had to look beyond the technology 
itself. The wider regulatory and institutional context had 
a major impact on what was feasible, to what extent and 
the sustainability of the interventions. For example, as 
revealed above, the fact that part of the policy community 
also consisted of members who had championed the 
processes that were being targeted by the changes 
represented a source of potential internal resistance (and 
impetus) that could not be overlooked (cf. Considine, 
2005:55), and also revealed the complexity of knowledge 
flows within policy communities. 
National and sub-national interests
The drive towards cross-national convergence was 
seen to be a balancing game between national interests, 
including sovereignty and right to auto-interpretation of 
international law, and regional aspirations, as much it was 
a balancing game for the various sub-national interests. 
Stakeholders argued that the process and the output that 
would best balance these multiple and fluctuating interests 
would then more than likely lead to an attainment of 
convergence. However, given the multiplicity and the 
internal as well as external location of the forces behind 
these interests, the attainment of convergence was 
admitted to be challenging, ‘and might not be worth the 
attention and resources it was getting’, according to one 
respondent from an NGO. This was also the main reason, 
as the same respondent pointed out, why the galvanizing 
factors were always changing, in reality or in framing only; 
reflecting an elusive search for a set of factors which were 
appropriately framed and shared by the region to enable a 
sustained regional focus towards convergence. Hilgartner 
and Bosk (1988) in their ‘arenas model’ refer to the 
importance of promoters of policy issues in sustaining it 
within the policy space in which there are other issues 
competing for attention. Many questions therefore arise 
regarding the way learning takes place and how it can 
be sustained within such a dynamic policy space. From a 
functionalistic point of view, NEPAD, the AU and SADC 
and other programmes were attempting to influence 
the playing field so that more predictable learning and 
boundary crossing could take place (cf. Stone 2000).
It also emerged that there were unfulfilled technological 
and regulatory expectations at sub-national and national 
levels, and stakeholders were keen to have these addressed 
before moving to the regional level (e.g. the limited 
successes of the RBFP25, the AU Model Law on Safety in 
Biotechnology; among others). It was observed that in 
this case the fears were directed more at the context, 
as opposed to the various organizations championing 
the convergence agenda. In other instances, the fears 
centered on the delivery capacity of the organizations 
championing the process. In the final analysis this duality 
represents the practical challenges of reconciling the 
various tensions around the issue and the pressures that 
champions of the policy processes face for stepping into 
the policy arena. 
International goals
The dominant presence of international regulatory and 
technological targets was said to be compelling the 
regional grouping and the member states to rush towards 
convergence, when they would be better off achieving 
incremental sub-national, national or regional goals. 
Considerable pressure was being put on countries as they 
did not want to be seen as failing to comply with standards 
that other countries were adhering to, and sometimes this 
affected firm underpinning of processes in national goals 
and imperatives26. The envisaged convergence was seen 
24 Policy maker/senior official from one of the SADC countries
25 Regional Biosafety Focal Point – a Dutch funded regional programme on biosafety implemented in 14 Eastern and Southern African 
countries between 1993 and 1997 (Chetsanga and Chigogora, 2001).
26 This was the opinion of most respondents who have taken part in international negotiations, notably the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources (ITPGRC) and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
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as having the potential of diverting countries’ focus and 
resources from their own processes towards the regional 
desires. It was therefore argued that given the slow pace 
at which conclusion of international policy processes took 
place; the desired convergence would also slow down the 
rate at which national processes took place. Generally, 
the international goals were not only slow in being set, 
but they also fluctuated a lot as a result of the often-
conflicting national, corporate and other forces around 
them. This put the goal-setting and decision-making 
process beyond the influence of the weak countries in 
the region and other parts of the developing world (cf. 
ECA, 2006). In response, countries have however tried 
to form international negotiation coalitions (for example 
during the negotiations of the Biosafety Protocol) to try 
and counter some of these challenges. The desire for 
regional convergence of biosafety systems was seen by 
some sections of policy makers as one way of trying to 
institutionalize the positive lessons from the negotiations 
around the Biosafety Protocol. On the other hand, this 
was viewed as an external motivator, and given the lack of 
unanimity within the Protocol negotiation process, some 
opponents saw this as ‘inheriting a weakness which will 
come back to haunt the regional convergence process’. 
They further argued that the push for convergence should 
not be modeled around rich versus poor, or as pitting 
environment and trade interests against each other, as 
what happened in the Protocol negotiations, because 
the region could ill-afford these dichotomies. The need 
for consensus on why convergence was desirable was 
highlighted, although some were quick to point out that 
this (consensus attainment) would mark another complex 
and protracted policy struggle which would unnecessarily 
divert the region’s focus. It was underscored that 
the consensus-building and the move towards the 
convergence should be attempted at the same time. It was 
also highlighted that trying to evade the different sectoral 
tensions (e.g. trade v environment etc) would only serve 
to create fallacies that would result in improper policy 
outputs. On the whole, it was abundantly evident that the 
interaction between the domestic and external forces for 
and against convergence seemed to have a bigger influence 
than first realised, especially when one took into view 
their link with the bigger macro-setting of the countries 
and the region. 
Turning a blind eye to the costs 
While the motivators for convergence were highlighted, 
an analysis of the costs of divergence seemed to be only 
an implied converse of the positives. Some respondents 
argued that as long as this un-quantified cost remained 
‘not so huge a deterrent’, then the necessary motivation 
could remain weak. One respondent from a scientific 
research institution in Namibia was very emphatic:
‘Sometimes it’s not about what stands to be gained, but 
what stands to be lost … I think it is true that African 
countries have tended to be stronger in staking their 
claim in situations where there is much to be lost; and 
in this case, we need to know what it is we stand to lose 
by continuing to develop and implement our systems 
independently. Also, it’s not as if there is no cooperation 
already. It is there as and when necessary, and maybe 
that’s all we require’’ [Res22 (R), Mar 2007].
The same respondent indicated that countries of the 
region seemed to have a lot of inertia as far as ‘going 
for gains’ was concerned. Maybe it had to do with the 
pressures, competition and other variables at play where 
there was room for a gain, because the bigger and stronger 
countries and other players would also be clamouring to 
occupy those vantage points. There was divided opinion 
in the SADC on whether to go for gain (harness the 
technology) or defend what was there (e.g., environmental 
protection). This was another level of the major emerging 
narratives for biosafety in particular and convergence in 
general in southern Africa; one school looking at ‘what 
do we stand to gain’ and another school looking at ‘what 
do we stand to lose’ (linked closely to level of use of the 
technology and development of regulatory systems). All 
this had implications on institutional arrangements as 
well as human, technological and other arrangements 
that needed to be put in place to make convergence of 
systems at the cross-national level feasible. South Africa 
for example was looking at being a bio-economy, and saw 
Sub-Saharan Africa as a market for products, while the 
rest of the countries did not have the same confidence and 
preparedness to have these visions. The other countries 
are at different positions in the continuum from the 
protectionist intentions to the technology exploitation 
objectives. Not surprisingly, South Africa was said to look 
more outside the region for technological and policy lessons. 
This clash between the protective and forward-looking 
approaches was a challenge for the convergence agenda, 
            J.  Technol.  Manag.  Innov.  2011, Volume 6, Issue 3
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://www.jotmi.org)
Journal of Technology Management & Innovation © Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Facultad de Economía y Negocios 42
starting from whether it was feasible or not, to the nature 
of the achievable convergence once the initial hurdles had 
been cleared. Yet it was also appreciated by most of the 
respondents that it would not be possible for there to be 
permanent and uncontested agreement on convergence, 
given the realities transcending the technology and the 
SADC region. It was therefore up to the stakeholders 
to find the best way of packaging their similarities in 
a way that galvanised rather than kept them apart. 
Resource diversion
There were also some fears based on resource diversion, 
for example, that once a regional technology management 
structure was in place, donors would prefer to put 
resources there at the expense of national programmes. 
This in many ways showed that stakeholders had no 
confidence in their own governments honouring their 
national obligations and making sure the national 
processes were kept going, feeding into the regional level 
arrangements. However, these fears of resource diversion 
and competition were real, and they exposed the fallacy 
of shared ideals around regional cooperation. Some 
respondents were quick to point out that already there 
were tensions between national programmes and some 
NEPAD initiatives. For example, some donors, especially 
the ‘big donors’ preferred to channel their assistance 
through NEPAD for quicker spread of their visibility, 
among other reasons, than doing so through national 
programmes. Such donors therefore favoured cross-
national convergence of regulatory systems. Meanwhile, 
apart from the attraction of financial resources, personnel, 
for example consultants, would also be more attracted 
to regional programmes than to national programmes, 
usually because of higher remuneration. There was the 
fear therefore that solving the regional level challenges 
could lead to escalation of the national problems, which 
were supposed to be the ingredients for viable regional 
programmes. In the final analysis, the truth of the matter 
was that any different policy and institutional arrangement 
brought with it a competition dimension because of 
resource and capacity constraints, and this diminished the 
enthusiasm towards it, as individuals and organizational 
actors alike felt threatened, eliciting some kind of negative 
feedback scenario (cf. Considine, 2005:43). 
Dampening innovation
Other fears were around how adoption of regional 
systems could curtail policy innovation in countries. 
Some respondents from government institutions argued 
that as much as there were both internal and external 
pressures necessitating urgency in coming up with 
functional systems, countries needed to go through the 
experience curve, in order to be able to own the policy 
instruments, as opposed to adopting and implementing 
lessons from elsewhere. This issue locks into many 
domains, for example sovereignty, and capacity building, 
where countries emphasized linking issues of biosafety at 
both national and regional levels to the broader national 
requirements, and ensuring that capacities for related 
policy responses were built. However, it was argued that 
sovereignty alone did not bring the needed incentive in 
development of programmes and processes, and there 
was need to balance the ‘freedom to innovate’ with 
avoiding ‘reinventing the wheel’. Others argued that 
countries of the region ought to appreciate that they 
had come a long way already through the experience 
curve, and maybe it was high time other measures, such 
as regional convergence, were put in place to stimulate 
further innovation. 
Threats to established relationships
As mentioned previously, tensions existed between 
‘cooperation with partners’ from outside the region 
(on the technology) and ‘strength in numbers’ from a 
regional standpoint. Some countries felt they benefited 
more from their partnerships with technology-rich 
trading partners outside the region, and they felt that 
the region only brought strength, in so far as managing 
technology risks was concerned. This was by no means 
an unimportant component of the agenda, but, according 
to some respondents who chose to portray themselves 
as realistic27, for developing the technology, some of the 
countries in the region had nothing to offer, and even the 
risk management dimension in some cases needed to be 
looked at beyond the strength-in-numbers perspective. 
This was a significant tension area and one where co-
existence was needed, because it was not conceivable 
27 Mainly laboratory scientists from one of the leading scientific and industrial research centres in the region
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that existing relationships would have to end, while 
at the same time, having these and the new regional 
arrangements for biosafety would in some cases create 
incompatibility problems. Pragmatic policy innovation 
and looking beyond narrow institutional and national 
interests may be needed to ensure a win-win scenario 
from this tension. The example of the UK-EU-US 
relations is a typical case in point for this tension, with 
the UK fully aware of the potential gains and losses of 
further integration into the EU given the long relationship 
with the US, which predates even the earliest roots of 
the EU28 . However, some international crises have arisen 
of late, in which many have questioned the prudence of 
the continued close alliance with the US, when the EU 
seems to have come of age. This was the same scenario 
that some SADC countries faced, and the challenge was 
how to balance the positives from both intra and extra-
regional alliances, especially in cases where they seemed 
to compromise each other. This seemed to throw weight 
to the notion of case-by-case cooperation arrangements, 
although it was a fact that cross-national relations were 
built over time, based on trust, and this might not happen 
as quickly as it should in times of crises if a case-by-case 
approach was adopted. The bigger and more complex 
issues around convergence were thus more daunting than 
a simple cursory glance could reveal.
One fallacy that countries would need to deal with, 
according to some respondents, was that of a permanent 
convergence, and one in which countries would be 
agreeing all the time. The differences amongst the 
countries in the pre-convergence era should be ample 
evidence that countries would always have differences. 
There was need to define the minimum differences that 
would not threaten the convergence or in whose presence 
the convergence would still subsist. This was a missing 
link, and as one respondent, a biosafety expert from the 
region now based in the UK pointed out:
‘‘Proponents of convergence should not fool themselves 
that there will come a time when countries will look at 
themselves as having been unreasonable at some stage. 
Countries will always see the justification for whatever 
views they hold (or have held), and it is how these 
differences are addressed which matters. If one country 
is expected to make a fool of itself, then for that simple 
reason, they may resist even the best of ideas’’ [Res19 
(OR), Mar 2007]
This again lent support to the earlier assertion by 
most stakeholders that it was the process of obtaining 
convergence, as opposed to the convergence output, 
which was more important in determining the feasibility 
of convergence. This was also in line with the convergence 
hypothesis, where different systems came together, with 
each one bringing its good attributes to the common agenda. 
Conclusions
This paper has described the contending stakeholder 
views on cross-national convergence or harmonisation 
of biosafety systems in southern Africa, laying bare the 
daunting task of either creating a predictable environment 
for cross-national learning; or ensuring effective learning 
even in this dynamic environment. Key among the many 
realities is the lack of a sustained, shared and adequately 
framed convergence agenda, as a result of the fluctuations 
within the region. This raised many questions at the higher 
level regarding how and why countries come together 
to cooperate on an issue. With respect to regimes, for 
example, some scholars argue that governments create 
or join regimes in order to make their commitments 
credible (Hasenclever et al, 2000). From the empirical 
results presented in this paper, there is some truth that 
some countries saw a regional approach to biotechnology 
management as a way of bolstering the credibility of the 
systems they were developing and employing in their 
domestic settings. Some countries were also advocating 
for convergence as a way of demonstrating their 
commitment to regional integration (through functional 
cooperation) and demonstrating their commitment to 
having the technology effectively regulated. There were 
also desires to promote investment in the technology, 
or meeting obligations or expectations of other partners 
with which the countries had relationships. These issues 
of credibility and demonstrating commitment seemed 
to work both ways; in that they could also be used by 
some countries to push against convergence as a way of 
showing their allegiance to the bigger forces that might 
be dictating to them certain positions, e.g. donors and 
development partners who were against biotechnology. 
28Robert Whelan, Sept 2007 Article on UK, EU and US relations: Foreign Policy Fears: the ‘special relationship’ versus strength in numbers
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This paper also showed that a government’s commitment 
to other governments through pushing for convergence 
may not only be at variance with their commitment to 
other external partners, but to domestic actors as well. 
Convergence is a balancing game where the government 
has to deal with many issues at vertical and horizontal 
levels within the broader socio-economic setting, at both 
national and regional levels. The question that remains, 
however, is if convergence is about demonstrating 
commitment, why would governments choose to 
demonstrate commitment through convergence? Why not 
demonstrate it through other means of cooperation. This 
was an argument presented by some neutrals who chose 
to call themselves realists … pointing to the inherent 
fragility of the converged position, given the different 
and fluctuating allegiances that the governments had to 
deal with. They also said the overall policy decisions in 
this technology were not entirely in ‘the hands’ of the 
national governments in the region, making the whole 
convergence agenda at the worst, ‘an exercise in futility’. 
It was also clear that policy convergence efforts were 
not separate policy endeavours, but were part of wider 
policy processes, especially within discussions around 
science and technology, agriculture, environment and 
trade. The wider processes therefore shaped these 
convergence efforts, as much as the convergence efforts 
shaped the processes. In addition, there was recognition 
that in facilitating convergence, the SNOs and other 
organisations were dependent on other actors and thus 
could not be viewed as isolated change agents. There 
was thus a significant role for agency in these processes, 
particularly around choices in selection of policy ideas, 
which was likely to result in bounded rationality in the 
imitation, copying or modification of policy innovations 
by decision makers.
 
Reference to external forces came hand-in-hand with 
perceptions of ‘coercion’, or limited choice among policy 
actors. On the other hand, a focus on voluntary mechanisms 
has been confirmed by other studies to direct analytical 
attention to the internal attributes and salient features of 
policy arenas, such as similar political ideologies, policy 
styles, culture, language, and institutional arrangements. 
This study also confirmed these trends, while also 
establishing that the various convergence mechanisms 
may not necessarily act uniformly in different polities, and 
that there were different sources of the policy lessons, 
ranging from internal to international sources. In the final 
analysis, this paper concludes that in the case of cross-
national cooperation in biosafety in southern Africa, this 
close look at contextual realities is important if grounded 
understandings of the feasibility of the cross-national 
convergence agenda are to emerge. 
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